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The social problem of unreasonably high pharmaceutical costs for patients in Chinese hospitals damages
the interests of patients and it has a highly negative impact on the long-term development of the Chinese
health service. We constructed a system dynamics model to address two problems, i.e., the unreasonably
high prices of drugs and the high level of pharmaceutical fees relative to the medical costs of patients,
and we suggest countermeasures and possible solutions. The program Vensim DSS was used to construct
a system dynamics model to represent the problem of high pharmaceutical fees for patients in Chinese
hospitals. If hospital and medical staff receive a higher kickback rate, they are more likely to prescribe
unnecessary expensive drugs to make greater proﬁts, which results in unnecessary drug consumption
and irrational drug use, eventually leading to unreasonably high pharmaceutical fees. The beneﬁt chain
of the main drug suppliers should be cut off. It is necessary to break the link between the proﬁts from
pharmaceutical sales and the prescribing behavior of physicians, and hospital incomes, to avoid any
conﬂicts of interest over how medicines are prescribed. Thus, cost-containment measures and a
reformed pharmaceutical distribution system are needed to regulate physicians and hospital interaction.
& 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
1.1. Problem/signiﬁcance
In recent years, the medical cost per capita for hospital outpatient
and inpatient has increased substantially and pharmaceutical fees for
patients in Chinese hospitals have experienced a sustained and rapid
growth. Pharmaceutical fees always represents higher than 50% of
expenditure per outpatient visit, and over 42% per inpatient episode
[1] (Table 1). The average pharmaceutical fees per outpatient visit is
about 0.5% of annual per capital income for urban residents and
about 1.7% for rural residents, while the average pharmaceutical fees
per inpatient episode is about 16% of annual per capital income for
urban residents and 53% for rural residents in recent years. The
excessively high pharmaceutical fees place a heavy economic burden
on society and patients, and this is a major issue of general concern.
The cause of irrational hospital drug use, unreasonable medical
examination, unreasonable treatments and other variables is the
high price of drugs, especially new or special drugs for treatment of
tumor or other serious diseases. Unreasonably high pharmaceutical
fees are a heavy social burden, which has been referred to as “the
difﬁculty and high cost of getting medical service.” To address this
problem, the Chinese government has taken a series of measures to
lower prices, such as cutting drug prices, implementing a drug
tendering system, and ending the collection of illegally extra charge
or fares for medical services. However, these measures have been
ineffective because of problems with pharmaceutical supply chain
and other factors.
The unsustainable growth of pharmaceutical fees is a universal
problem that leads to the implementation of pharmaceutical cost-
containment policy measures. A range of supply-side and demand-
side measures, both direct and indirect, must be applied that
target the price and/or the volume components. The policy that
separates the prescription and dispensing of pharmaceuticals in
Korea has not controlled antibiotic abuse and particularly incon-
veniences disabled and elderly individuals [2], whereas some
measures such as positive lists, negative lists, prescription budgets,
reference pricing, and changes in the pharmacy payment system
have been effective in some countries but only in the short
term [3–5]. Therefore, it is important to develop a practical
solution to solve the problem of unreasonably high pharmaceu-
tical fees for patients in Chinese hospitals based on an in-depth
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and comprehensive analysis to determine the causes and mechan-
ism of excessive high pharmaceutical fees for patients.
1.2. Objective
This study aimed to build a system dynamics model that
accurately represented the behaviors of pharmaceutical systems
to identify the causes of two problems, i.e., the unreasonably high
price of drugs and the high proportion of pharmaceutical fees in
the overall medical costs of patients in Chinese hospital, which
allowed us to explore methods for controlling pharmaceutical fees.
2. Methods
The development of pharmaceutical fees is dynamic, multi-
layered, and multi-nonlinear. Therefore, traditional mathematical
models are inadequate for its quantitative analysis. By contrast,
system dynamics (SD) can analyze problems using an entire
system to estimate the dynamics of developing trends in indivi-
dual systems [6]. To investigate this complex dynamic system, we
used the SD methodology to represent the factors that are likely to
be involved using the system structure formalism of SD.
SD processing aids the conceptualization and rational analysis
of the structure, interactions, and behavioral modes of complex
systems and subsystems to explore, assess, and prognosticate on
their impacts in an integrated and holistic manner [7]. Thus, SD
helps us to understand the entire process and to identify points of
intervention. Since its conception in the 1960s, several studies
have used the SD approach to address or simulate scenarios for a
large number of different applications, such as medical institutions
[8], waste management systems [7,9,10], population prediction [11],
health sciences teaching [12], inpatient discharge from emergency
departments [13], hospital behaviors [14], disaster planning and
control [15–17], immunization health issues [18], and drug discov-
ery processes [19]. The use of SD modeling approaches to investi-
gate pharmaceutical fees has not been explored before.
SD is a computer simulation method for understanding systems
and how they change in terms of feedback mechanisms or loops
[20]. The steps involved in a SD simulation are: ﬁrst, deﬁne the
problem and boundary of the research. Second, put forward
dynamic changes due to system internal feedback structure
hypothesis, and develop the causal loop diagrams which depict
the interactions and cause-and-effect relationships among the
different system parameters graphically. Third, identify the most
important stocks and ﬂows that change these stock levels, sources
of information that impact the ﬂows, and the main feedback loops,
and draw a causal loop diagram that links the stocks, ﬂows
and sources of information. Fourth, write the mathematical for-
mulations that determine the ﬂows, and estimate the parameters
and initial conditions. Fifth, analyze if the model conform to reality.
Last, simulate the model and analyze results. Vensim DSS is a
powerful environment for developing high quality simulation
models and it has a number of capabilities that go beyond simple
model development. Thus, our model was developed using the
Vensim DSS program.
There is a widespread recognition of the application of SD
principles such as model description, causal loop diagrams, and
stock-ﬂow diagrams, as described by many researchers [20,21]. We
developed a conceptual framework of the effects of several factors
related to pharmaceutical fees for patients in Chinese hospitals.
2.1. Model description
There are several different drug prices for both brand name
drugs and generic drugs throughout the sales process, i.e., the cost
price, producer price, actual price, wholesale price (the ledger
price), and retail price. Pharmaceutical manufacturers sell drugs to
pharmaceutical distributors at the producer price, which is about
120% of the cost price. Pharmaceutical distributors then provide
drugs to hospitals at the actual price (in theory, the actual price
should be the same as the wholesale price, which is also the ledger
price of hospitals, although the former is usually much lower than
the latter, i.e., 80% to 90%, and the balance is returned to hospitals
by pharmaceutical distributors as a discount). Hospitals sell drugs
to patients after adding 15% to the ledger price, which becomes the
retail price of the drug, and Patients can only use drugs prescript
in hospital. As mentioned above, hospitals have an absolute
monopoly with respect to the patients or pharmaceutical distri-
butors, which makes hospitals both monopsonist and oligopsonist.
Because of the absolute monopoly status of hospitals with respect
to the patients or pharmaceutical companies, there is a ﬁerce
competition among pharmaceutical manufacturers and pharma-
ceutical distributors. Some money is usually returned to the
hospital as kickbacks or for academic sponsorship, although this
is not allowed by the state. To encourage physicians to prescribe
their drugs, pharmaceutical distributors always provide certain
kickbacks to physicians depending on the amount of drugs they
prescribe. All of these issues lead to an increase in drug prices and
the overall pharmaceutical fees.
2.2. Causal loop diagram
A causal loop diagram can be developed based on the factors
included in the conceptual model of pharmaceutical fees. Similar
to factors that affected US drug costs in 2008 (including drugs
in development, the diffusion of new drugs, drug safety concerns,
generic drugs, Medicare Part D, and changes in the drug supply
chain) [22], speciﬁc factors affect drug sales in China, including,
pharmaceutical manufacturers, pharmaceutical distributors, hos-
pitals, and physicians. Fig. 1 shows an abstract and conceptual
model that depicts the interactions among the key factors. The
Table 1
Pharmaceutical costs per capita for outpatients and inpatients in general hospitals.
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Medical cost per outpatient visit (RMB) 118 126.9 128.7 136.1 146.5 159.5 173.8 179.8
Pharmaceutical fees per outpatient visit (RMB) 62 66 65 68 74 81.2 88.1 90.9
Proportion of pharmaceutical fees of the total medical costs per outpatient visit (%) 52.5 52.1 50.5 50 50.5 50.9 50.7 50.6
Pharmaceutical fees per outpatient visit/urban resident's annual per capital income (%) 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4
Pharmaceutical fees per outpatient visit/rural residents' annual per capital income (%) 2.1 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.3
Medical cost per inpatient episode (RMB) 4284.8 4661.5 4668.9 4973.8 5463.8 5951.8 6525.6 6632.2
Pharmaceutical fees per inpatient episode (RMB) 1872.9 2045.6 1992 2148.9 2400.4 2619.8 2834.4 2770.5
Proportion of pharmaceutical fees of the total medical costs per inpatient episode (%) 43.7 43.9 42.7 43.2 43.9 44 43.4 41.8
Pharmaceutical fees per inpatient episode/urban residents' annual per capital income (%) 19.9 19.5 16.9 15.6 15.2 15.3 14.8 12.7
Pharmaceutical fees per inpatient episode/rural residents' annual per capital income (%) 63.8 62.8 55.5 51.9 50.4 50.8 47.9 39.7
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meanings of the loops in the diagram are now explained further, as
follows.
Analysis of the pharmaceutical production. Though China has
been sweeping changes to improve its environment for pharma-
ceutical R&D, pharmaceutical industry in China is still dominated by
the generic drug manufacturers [23]. Most of the pharmaceutical
manufacturers are small-scale pharmaceutical industry with dupli-
cated production processes [24]. There is also ﬁerce competition
among pharmaceutical manufacturers. Competition is not about
quality, innovation, safety and service, and instead it depends on
unfair factors, such as the rate of discount and the amount of
kickbacks, which leads to a substantial increase in the production
price of drugs. The unreasonably high price of drugs leads to high
proﬁt margins, which allows a relatively low entry into the
pharmaceutical industry, so more and more manufacturers enter
the pharmaceutical market and this exacerbates the duplicated
construction and the aggressive competition within the industry.
Analysis of the pharmaceutical distribution. There are two
markets in the Chinese drug circulation domain: the retail market
and the intermediaries market. The intermediaries are comprised
of medical representatives and pharmaceutical distributors at all
levels, and this is the main circulation channel for drugs. The
excessive level of circulation and principal transactions, as well as
excessive commercial promotion activities due to the ineffective
governmental supervision, causes a ﬁerce competition among
intermediaries (medical representatives and pharmaceutical dis-
tributors). Thus, they have to promote sales using sales commis-
sions or kickbacks to hospital managers and/or doctors who
purchase or prescribe their drugs, which directly increase the
transaction costs, disorderly competition, and ultimately it leads
to a state of disorder. There are usually six to nine supply-
chain links from pharmaceutical manufacturers to patients, and
high pharmaceutical fees stem from multiple layers of intermedi-
aries [25].
Analysis of the compensation for hospitals. Compensation for
hospitals comes mainly in three areas, i.e., the government's
ﬁnancial investment, medical services income, and income from
pharmaceuticals. The government investment is increasingly being
reduced and the generally lower price of Chinese medical services
means that hospitals are allowed to add 15% to the wholesale price
to make up for the lack of ﬁnancial funds allocated, which ensures
their continued development. This price-setting approach pro-
vides incentives for over-prescribing drugs. As a result, hospitals
emphasize the drug price difference and seek more proﬁt by the
extra net proceeds from drugs, and maintain their operation based
on the high proﬁts from drugs.
Analysis of the drug consumption. Because of the ﬁerce
competition in the pharmaceutical distribution industry, kickbacks
are given to physicians as a type of sales promotion. In contrast to
the consumption of general merchandise, patients lack the rele-
vant expertise to make drug choice. Thus, they have no choice but
to follow the advice of physicians when using drugs, so the
relationship between patients and doctors is principal-agent.
Based on their own economic interests, physicians encourage
patients to use more drugs, and more expensive drugs. Thus,
irrational drug use is increased and a vicious circle is formed based
on the higher price of drugs and higher sales volume. It was shown
by a study in Israel that most of the personnel form government
department that interviewed recognized that the relationship
between physicians and pharmaceutical companies harms the
patients, at economic and health levels [26]. Thus, the attitudes
of patients toward physicians receiving gifts from the pharmaceu-
tical industry should be considered.
2.3. Stock-ﬂow diagram
To make the size of the arrays in the model brief and mean-
ingful [27], four parts in the process of drug production and
Fig. 1. Casual loop diagram of pharmaceutical fees. Explicated how government, pharmaceutical manufacturers, pharmaceutical distributors, hospitals, physicians, and
patients lead to high pharmaceutical fees for patients in Chinese hospitals.
Table 2
The sizes of the arrays in the simulation model.
Simulation model Reality Justiﬁcation
Five drug prices Five main drug prices This study distinguishes ﬁve drug prices throughout the sales process: (1) the cost price, (2) producer price,
(3) actual price, (4) wholesale price (the ledger price), and (5) retail price. Consequently, our simulation model
contains ﬁve drug prices.
Five stakeholders Six main stakeholders There are six main stakeholders in drug circulation (government, pharmaceutical manufacturers, pharmaceutical
distributors, hospitals, physicians, and patients). For patients lack the relevant expertise to make drug choice and
have no choice but to follow the advice of physicians when using drugs, only ﬁve stakeholders (government,
pharmaceutical manufacturers, pharmaceutical distributors, hospitals, and physicians) are taken into account in
the model.
Four process in drug
consumption
Four main process in drug
consumption
There are four main processes in drug consumption: (1) pharmaceutical production, (2) pharmaceutical
distribution, (3) compensation for hospitals, and (4) drug consumption. So our simulation model contains four
loops in the diagram.
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circulation are taken into the model, i.e., the pharmaceutical
manufacturers, pharmaceutical distributors, hospitals, and physi-
cians who work together to decide drug costs (Table 2). Therefore,
in accordance with this type of pharmaceutical market circulation,
the system was divided into four subsystems, i.e., problems caused
by pharmaceutical manufacturers, pharmaceutical distributors,
hospitals, and physicians. These four subsystems have input and
output variables into each other, thereby forming the relationship
with interactions and mutual checks, which helps to construct an
SD model of “the unreasonably high pharmaceutical fees for
patients in Chinese hospitals.”
Fig. 2 shows the system structure diagram derived from our
work on conceptualizing pharmaceutical fees dynamics and spe-
cial control efforts. This diagram may help the reader to visualize
the complex interactions among the numerous factors that shape
drug circulation. The rectangles in the diagram depict stocks,
which characterize the quantity of drugs at any given point in
time in the different categories, according to their status in the
drug supply chain. The double-lined arrows between stocks
represent ﬂows, known as the rate variable, whereby drugs shift
from one state to another over time. Single-lined links represent
causal relationships.
The embedded mathematical equations are divided into two
main categories: the stock equations and the ﬂow equations. Stock
equations deﬁne the accumulations within the system via the time
integrals of the net ﬂow rates. Another typical form of stock
equations is used to deﬁne the smoothed stock variables, which
are the expected values of speciﬁc variables that are usually
obtained from their past values using exponential smoothing.
The production inventory level, total production, circulative inven-
tory level, total circulative volume, hospital inventory level, total
purchase quantity, and the total drug consumption were modeled
as stock delineated by a number of neighboring components. For
example, production inventory level represents the quantity of
production inventory at the time. If we know the quantity of
production level this week (initial production inventory), we can
guess what will be the production inventory next week. To do that,
the quantity of productive output and the quantity of turn volume
which called rate variable are needed. The quantity of productive
output simply counting the quantity f production, while the
quantity of turn volume is simply counting the quantity of drugs
which taken out of store and come into circulation. So by using the
program Vensim DSS, the equation of production inventory is:
production inventory level¼ INTEG (þproductive output-turn
volume, initial production inventory). Flow equations deﬁne the
ﬂows among the stocks as functions of time. Converters and
constants form the ﬁne structure of ﬂow variables. The mathema-
tical equations for the speciﬁc model, as provided by Vensim DSS,
are included in Appendix A.
2.4. Sensitivity analysis
Sensitivity analysis was used to determine how a given model
responds to variations in parameter values [28], which should be
performed to assess the liability of the results and is possibly the
most useful and most widely used technique available to modelers
Fig. 2. The system dynamics model of pharmaceutical fees. Seven level variables: the production inventory level, total production, circulative inventory level, total circulative
volume, hospital inventory level, total purchase quantity, and the total drug consumption. Four rates variables: productive output, turn volume, purchase quantity, and drug
consumption.
Table 3
Sensitivity analysis of constant parameters.
Constant parameters 3% 2% 1% 1% 2% 3% Sensitivity
Average proﬁt of hospital drugs 0.04913 0.02636 0.00985 0.08267 0.02619 0.04872 1.7542
Kickback rate for physicians 0.12281 0.08855 0.05062 0.04889 0.08053 0.12026 4.1674
Distribution cost 0.00108 0.00079 0.00059 0.00054 0.00077 0.00099 0.0374
Fixed production cost 0.00067 0.00033 0.000014 0.00018 0.00037 0.00075 0.0209
Wholesale price 0.04012 0.02615 0.01706 0.01665 0.02434 0.003877 0.9524
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who wish to support decision makers [29]. In this study, we chose
parameters with variation rate from 3% to 3% to simulate the
variation of drug consumption. To calculate the parameter sensi-
tivity, ΔY(t)/Y(t) represents the change of drug consumption
(dependent variable), while ΔX(t)/X(t) represents the change of
independent variable.
SðtÞ ¼ ΔYðtÞ=YðtÞΔXðtÞ=XðtÞ








In order to explore drug consumption's responses to changes in
constant parameters, ﬁve constant parameters was used to calcu-
late the parameter sensitivity (Table 3). Sensitivity analysis indi-
cates that drug consumption's responses to changes in constant
parameters are within the reasonable range. Slight changes in
constant parameters have not resulted in extreme changes in
behavioral modes of the model, that is to say, the model is valid
and may be applied in simulation analysis.
3. Results
SD is a methodology that facilitates the capture of the diffusion
effect of regulatory interventions, because it can efﬁciently map
the time necessary for the manifestation of these interventions in
the system. Therefore, in this study, the model was used to
perform intervention experiments, where the inﬂuence on all
the sectors of drug distribution could be observed by changing
the system parameters.
3.1. Effect of drug prices on drug consumption and total irrational
drug consumption
In this case, only the drug prices are changed while all other
variables remain ﬁxed. Fig. 3 shows the effect of the price on drug
consumption every week and total irrational drug consumption. In
Test 1, the wholesale drug price was set to 40 RMB. Drug
consumption declined and in the 12th week the drug was rarely
used and it was about to exit the market. Fig. 3 also shows that the
total irrational drug consumption is quite low, which agrees with
the theory that lower drug usage results in lower irrational drug
consumption. In Test 2, the price of drug was adjusted to 64 RMB
and drug consumption every week remains on a straight line,
where the drug usage stays at a certain level with little volatility.
The total irrational drug consumption is low. In Test 3, the drug
price is increased to 66 RMB. Drug consumption every week
increases steadily and the total irrational drug consumption
increases slightly. In Test 4, the price of drug is set as high as 80
and its usage increases until it reaches a peak in the 6th week. The
total irrational drug consumption increases rapidly. The results
suggest that regulated price decreases appear to have limited
effect in controlling in pharmaceutical costs but can contribute to
consumption decline. A few inexpensive drugs apparently are no
longer sufﬁciently proﬁtable for manufacturers to produce, dis-
tributors to sell and physicians to prescribe.
3.2. Effect of the kickback rate to physicians on drug consumption
Assuming that the initial drug price is 64 RMB, the effect of the
kickback rate to physicians on drug consumption every week and
total irrational drug consumption is shown in Fig. 4, while all other
variables are ﬁxed. In Test 1, the kickback for physicians is 5% of
the drug's retail price. Drug consumption every week declines
rapidly to zero in the 16th week with total irrational drug
consumption near zero. In Test 2, the kickback to physicians
increases to 15% of the retail price and the drug consumption
every week is almost a straight line with little volatility in
consumption. In Test 3, the rate is set as high as 20%. Usage
increases dramatically and it reaches its peak in the 8th week, as
does overall irrational drug consumption, which has an increasing
rectilinear trend since the 4th week.
Fig. 3. The variation trend of drug consumption after regulating drug prices. Estimated drug consumption every week and total irrational drug consumption when drug
prices are changed in 52 weeks. The wholesale drug price was set to 40 RMB, 64 RMB, 66 RMB, and 80 RMB for the four experimental plans Test 1, Test 2, Test 3, and Test 4,
respectively.
Fig. 4. The variation trend of drug consumption after regulating the kickback rate to physicians. Estimated drug consumption every week and total irrational drug
consumption when kickback rate to physicians are changed in 52 weeks. The kickback rate to physicians was set to 5%, 15%, and 20% for the three experimental plans Test 1,
Test 2, and Test 3, respectively.
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3.3. Effect of the kickback rate to hospitals on purchasing volume
The effect of changing the kickback rate to hospitals on drug
consumption and irrational drug consumption is shown in Fig. 5,
while other variables remain ﬁxed. In Test 1, the kickback rate to
hospitals is 10%. The purchasing volume declines rapidly and it is
close to zero after the 25th week, with no further purchases
thereafter. In Test 2, the kickback rate to the hospitals increases
to 25% and the purchases remain at a certain level. In Test 3, the
rate is set as high as 30% and purchases of the drug increase
signiﬁcantly.
4. Discussion and conclusions
The results show that in the current drug distribution system,
measures to reduce drug price appears to have limited effect in
controlling pharmaceutical fees growth. High price equals great
proﬁt for pharmaceutical manufacturers, pharmaceutical distribu-
tors, hospitals and physicians, so expensive drugs are preferred by
all of them. In order to attract pharmaceutical distributors and
hospitals to their drug, pharmaceutical manufacturers request
high price. Drug with low price are not proﬁtable for manufac-
turers, distributors, hospitals and physicians, so their consumption
may decline or even vanish.
As shown in the experiment, the kickback rate for physicians
plays an extremely important role in the usage of drugs because it
affects pharmaceutical production and circulation. This is the most
direct and fundamental factor affecting the dosages of drugs
prescription. Thus, the current situation can be explained based
on the link between pharmaceutical sales and physician prescrib-
ing behavior, which encourages physicians to prescribe more
drugs than are needed.
Hospitals focus on pharmaceutical beneﬁts by increasing the
quantity used (such as more drugs and more expensive drugs) and
higher kickback rates (such as high-priced drugs and a high
kickback rate). For a long time, the state has allowed hospitals to
use the income from drugs to make up for the medical deﬁcit,
which encourages them to increase revenue via drug sales. Thus,
hospitals take advantage of kickbacks and proﬁt from drugs to
make up for the inadequate funding of hospitals. If this situation
continues, hospitals will try to increase their proﬁts by selling
more drugs and the pharmaceutical fees will increase for patients.
To address this problem, several measures have to be taken such as
deepening the reform of the health system, changing the operat-
ing mechanism in hospitals [30], increasing government inputs,
and improving the distribution system to hospitals. The plan for
reform unveiled in 2009 outlining investments of 850 billion RMB
($124 billion) in the next three years to expand insurance cover-
age, establish an “national essential medicines system”, improve
grassroots health-care institutions, universalize basic public health
services, and reform the ﬁnancing system for care, particularly in
public hospitals. The essential medicines system aims to improve
medicine availability, affordability and safety, and cut the proﬁt
link between health institutions, doctors, and medicine. China
published the 7th edition of the National Essential Medicines List
(2009), and essential drugs would be produced and distributed
under government control and supervision and would be reim-
bursable by medical insurance. Although these measures have
shown promising results, further efforts are needed to achieve the
ultimate goal of providing affordable and high-quality care.
System dynamics (SD) is used in the research. System
Dynamics (SD) is a methodology and mathematical modeling
technique for framing, understanding, and discussing complex
issues and problems. It deals with internal feedback loops and
time delays that affect the behavior of the entire system. While
other simulation methods such as Montecarlo (also called random
simulation, or random sampling, or statistic testing) is a type of
simulation that relies on repeated random sampling and statistical
analysis to compute the results. Montecarlo is ﬁt for discrete
system simulation, and SD is ﬁt for continuous system simulation.
Taken the aim of the research into consideration, the method of SD
is chose.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst qualitative
evaluation of pharmaceutical fees in China using an SD tool. An
SD modeling tool was used to estimate the pharmaceutical fees in
China, which was practical given limited availability of historical
data on drug consumption. The SD model allowed us to estimate
the pharmaceutical expenditure in changing environments. The
holistic model can be used to identify effective policies and the
optimal parameters for various strategic decision-making pro-
blems. The developed model can be used further to analyze
various scenarios and answer questions about the long-term
operation of pharmaceutical expenditures. It may prove useful to
policy-makers/regulators and decision-makers dealing with a
wide spectrum of pharmaceutical expenditure management
issues.
There are limitations that need to be addressed in future
research. This is the ﬁrst time we have constructed a model based
on SD to address the “unreasonably high pharmaceutical fees for
patients in Chinese hospitals” and to perform intervention experi-
ments. This model can be used to address many complex factors,
such as the stakeholders' pursuit of proﬁt, and factors such as
population growth, changes in the disease spectrum, the increas-
ing demand for health services, and individual patient character-
istics. In addition, the present model has not yet attempted to
consider speciﬁc hospitals, individual patient characteristics, and
social insurance schemes. The governmental supervision system
and adaptive changes of manufacturers, distributors, hospitals,
and physicians are not taken into account in the intervention trial
measures. To make the model more practical and realistic, pro-
blems mentioned above will be addressed during the next step.
In conclusion, the problem of “unreasonably high pharmaceu-
tical fees” is due to a structural disequilibrium that promotes
beneﬁt-ﬁrst in the main parts of the medical and health service
system, and the lack of supervision of drug production and sales.
Transaction cost and kickbacks add to the overall pharmaceutical
fees paid by patients in Chinese hospitals. To address this problem,
the beneﬁt chain for the main drug suppliers must be cut. It is
necessary to break the links between the proﬁts from pharma-
ceutical sales, physician prescribing behavior, and hospital income
to prevent the current conﬂicts of interest over how medicines are
Fig. 5. The variation trend of purchases after regulating the kickback rate to
hospitals. Estimated purchase quantity when kickback rate to hospitals are changed
in 52 weeks. The kickback rate to hospitals was set to 10%, 25%, and 30% for the
three experimental plans Test 1, Test 2, and Test 3, respectively.
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prescribed [31]. Thus, cost-containment measures and a reform of
the pharmaceutical distribution system are needed.
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Appendix A. Mathematical equations used by the model
circulative inventory level¼ INTEG (turn volume-purchase
quantity, initial circulative inventory)
production inventory level¼ INTEG (þproductive output-turn
volume, initial production inventory)
hospital inventory level¼ INTEG (purchase quantity- drug
consumption, initial hospital inventory)
total purchase quantity¼ INTEG (purchase quantity, initial
hospital inventory)
total turn volume¼ INTEG (þturn volume, initial circulative
inventory)
total production¼ INTEG (productive output, initial production
inventory)
total drug consumption¼ INTEG (drug consumption, initial
drug consumption)
purchase quantity¼excess proﬁt rate of hospital drugs*IF THEN
ELSE(SMOOTH(drug consumption, 1)-hospital inventory
level4¼0, SMOOTH(drug consumption, 1)-hospital
inventory level, 0)
turn volume¼proﬁt for the term of distributor*IF THEN ELSE
(SMOOTH (purchase quantity, 2)-circulative inventory
level4¼0, SMOOTH( purchase quantity, 2)-circulative
inventory level, 0)
productive output¼production margin*(IF THEN ELSE
((SMOOTH3 (turn volume, 2)-production inventory level)4¼0,
SMOOTH3(turn volume, 2)-production inventory level, 0))
drug consumption¼ IF THEN ELSE(rate of excess
kickback*current drug consumption 4¼upper limit of drug
consumption, upper limit of drug consumption , rate of excess
kickback*current drug consumption)
total irrational drug consumption¼ IF THEN ELSE(total drug
consumption-the total rational drug consumption o¼0, 0,
total drug consumptionthe total rational drug
consumption)
rate of excess kickback¼kickbacks for physicians/the average
kickback
produce price¼wholesale prices*R1
current drug consumption¼DELAY1I(drug consumption, 1,
initial drug consumption)
retail price¼wholesale prices*( kickback rate for hospital þ1)
proﬁt through circulation¼wholesale prices-produce price-
kickbacks for physicians-distribution cost
proﬁt for the term of distributor¼(distribution costþproﬁt
through circulation)/distribution cost
current proﬁts of distribution¼proﬁt through circulation*turn
volume
the total proﬁt through circulation¼total turn volume*proﬁt
through circulation
productive proﬁts¼produce price-ﬁxed production costs
production margin¼(ﬁxed production costsþproductive
proﬁts)/ﬁxed production costs
current proﬁt of manufacturer¼productive output*productive
proﬁts
total production proﬁts¼total production*productive proﬁts
current kickbacks for physicians¼current dosage*kickbacks for
physicians
total kickbacks for physicians¼kickbacks for physicians*the
total dosage
current proﬁt of hospital¼hospital proﬁts*purchase quantity
hospital proﬁts¼retail pricewholesale prices
excess proﬁt rate of hospital drugs¼hospital proﬁts/average
proﬁt of hospital drugs
total proﬁt of hospital¼total purchase quantity*hospital proﬁts
the total rational drug consumption ¼the rational drug
consumption*Time
initial circulative inventory¼1000
initial manufacturing inventory¼4000
initial hospital stock¼0
initial drug consumption¼500
ﬁxed production costs¼10
the rational drug consumption ¼800
the average kickback¼12
distribution cost¼10
wholesale prices¼64
FINAL TIME¼52
INITIAL TIME¼0
kickback rate for physicians ¼0.15
average proﬁt of hospital drugs¼15
upper limit of drug consumption¼3000
R1¼0.2
kickback rate for hospital¼0.25
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